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SOURCES OF LAW, SOURCES OF AUTHORITY:  
THE FAILURE OF THE PHILIPPINES’ CODE OF MUSLIM 
PERSONAL LAWS 
Gregory M. Chiarella† 
Abstract: The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (“CMPL”) was 
established in 1977 as part of an effort to quell longstanding violence between Christians 
and Muslims in the predominantly Christian country.  This codification of Islamic laws in 
the areas of marriage, divorce, and inheritance provided for a system of Shari‛a courts 
that would operate within the larger framework of the legal system of the Philippines.  
Three and a half decades later, the CMPL has had little effect.  The Shari‛a courts are 
understaffed and underutilized, accounting for less than 0.1% of the caseload in the 
Philippines.  The CMPL is plagued by a series of practical and procedural shortcomings.  
More significantly, it limits the use of customary law and excludes or marginalizes 
familiar sources of Muslim authority, minimizing its appeal for Muslims who had hoped 
that the CMPL would provide greater rights and freedoms.  In order to revitalize the 
CMPL and further engage Muslim citizens in the Philippines, this comment argues for a 
variety of practical and procedural changes to increase knowledge of and access to the 
CMPL, an increase in the use of customary law, and for the creation of more leadership 
roles for Muslims.†† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Conflict between Christians and Muslims has been a fact of life in the 
Philippines for centuries.1  Hostility between these two religious groups has 
destabilized the country at times and has contributed to economic, political, 
and legal inequalities.  As part of an effort to put an end to this religious 
conflict, the government of the Philippines agreed in 1977 to adopt a Code 
of Muslim Personal Laws (“CMPL”). 2   The CMPL theoretically allows 
Muslims to exercise limited control over their judicial fates through a legal 
system based on Islamic law (“Shari‛a”).  While the CMPL has achieved 
                                                     
†
 J.D. Candidate, University of Washington, 2012.  The author would like to thank Professor Clark 
Lombardi for introducing him to the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines and helping to 
develop this comment, the editorial staff at the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, and his wife, Kathryn. 
††
 In accordance with the policies of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Arabic words that have 
entered common English usage will not be italicized.  Arabic words that are not in common usage will be 
italicized.  Arabic words will not use diacritical marks such as macrons.  However, apostrophes and reverse 
apostrophes will be employed to signal the letters hamza and ‘ayn, respectively. 
1
 See THOMAS M. MCKENNA, MUSLIM RULERS AND REBELS: EVERYDAY POLITICS AND ARMED 
SEPARATISM IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES (1998) for an in-depth discussion of this history.  Christians, 
especially Catholics, are the dominant religious group in the Philippines today, constituting greater than 
ninety percent of the population.  The World Factbook: Philippines, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). 
2
 Justin Holbrook, Legal Hybridity in the Philippines: Lessons in Legal Pluralism from the 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 403, 420 (2010). 
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some success, it remains a rarely used and poorly managed afterthought in 
the context of the larger judicial system.   
The CMPL has the potential to supply Muslims with a sense of 
empowerment and control over their lives.  Instead, it creates an ineffective 
legal system that reminds Muslims that their concerns are secondary to those 
of the Christian majority.  To revitalize the system established under the 
CMPL and transform it into a potent source of law that more effectively 
engages Muslims, the Filipino government must 1) address procedural and 
practical shortcomings in the application of the CMPL and 2) address issues 
of content by drawing upon appropriate sources of law and familiar sources 
of authority.  In doing so, the government can reenergize the CMPL and 
demonstrate to Muslims throughout the country that it is committed to 
furnishing an effective legal system based on Shari‛a. 
Part II of this comment examines the history of conflict between 
Muslims and Christians in the Philippines and explains the origins of the 
CMPL.  Part III identifies and analyzes the primary reasons for the CMPL’s 
ineffectiveness, namely, practical and procedural shortcomings coupled with 
a failure to identify appropriate sources of law and authority.  Part IV 
suggests practical solutions for improving administration of the CMPL, 
outlines jurisdictional reforms that will instill greater faith in the Shari‛a 
court system, and argues that the CMPL must be amended to allow for 
greater use of customary law and provide a role for several significant 
sources of authority. 
II. THE CMPL WAS INTRODUCED TO RESOLVE LONG-STANDING 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Islam and Christianity reached the Philippines as explorers and traders 
expanded the geographic range of both religions from the fourteenth to the 
sixteenth century. 3   The two religions came into fierce and prolonged 
conflict almost immediately. 4   Divided by geography, culture, and 
eventually levels of commercial and industrial development, religious 
differences between Muslims and Christians remain a flashpoint for violence 
and upheaval on a national scale.5  The CMPL emerged through an effort to 
reduce religious tensions and restore peace to the Philippines. 
                                                     
3
  1 O. D. CORPUZ, THE ROOTS OF THE FILIPINO NATION, 54-55 (2005). 
4
  LUIS H. FRANCIA, A HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINES: FROM INDIOS BRAVOS TO FILIPINOS 51-62, 90-
95 (2010). 
5
  See, e.g., Simon Roughneen, New Violence in the Philippines Sparks Terrorism Fears, WASH. 
TIMES, Oct. 30 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/oct/30/new-violence-in-philippines-
sparks-terrorism-fears/.  
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A. The Relationship Between Muslims and Christians in the Philippines 
Has Been Defined by Conflict for Centuries 
Conflict between Islam and Christianity in the Philippines began as 
soon as the Spanish arrived in 1521.  The Spanish immediately and 
aggressively expanded their influence. 6   The large southern island of 
Mindanao and several smaller surrounding islands became the principal 
bastion of Islam in the Philippines, while the Spanish established themselves 
in the north.7  The religious differences between the North and the South, 
exacerbated by natural geographic barriers, led to a rigidly segmented 
society.8   
The Spanish controlled much of the Philippines for over three 
centuries, during which Catholicism assumed the mantle of state religion.9  
The Spanish were unable to conquer the Muslim communities of the 
South,10 however, as Muslim groups set aside their differences in order to 
confront a common foe. 11   Ironically, the relatively advanced Muslim 
political systems of the southern Philippines disadvantaged the region 
economically.  As the North experienced substantial industrial growth under 
Spanish rule, the South maintained a defensive posture that stymied 
economic development.12   Combined with existing religious and cultural 
differences, the North’s economic growth and relative prosperity 
exacerbated the divisions between the two regions.13  The Spanish defeat at 
the hands of the United States in 1898 led to an increase in violence, but 
changed little in the substantive relationship between Muslims and 
Christians. 14    
Independence, achieved in the wake of World War II, also failed to 
unify the nation.  Instead, it led to a resurrection of violence based on 
religion and geography.  Shortly after the Philippines gained independence, 
the government resettled hundreds of thousands of Christians on fertile lands 
in Mindanao, displacing Muslim farmers who had comprised a majority of 
the population in the region and establishing Christians—especially 
                                                     
6
  FRANCIA, supra note 4, at 51-62. 
7
  Id. at 45-46, 62-63. 
8
  Holbrook, supra note 2, at 411. 
9
  CORPUZ, supra note 3, at 185-243 (expounding upon the Christianization of the Philippines). 
10
 FRANCIA, supra note 4, at 93-94.   
11
  See CORPUZ, supra note 3, at 58-59. 
12
  AMER M. BARA-ACAL & ABDULMAJID ASTIH, MUSLIM LAW ON PERSONAL STATUS IN THE 
PHILIPPINES 9-10 (1998).   
13
  Id. 
14
  Holbrook, supra note 2, at 413-15. 
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Catholics—as the dominant religious group.15  Today, Muslims represent 
less than thirty percent of the population of Mindanao.16  This demographic 
shift, combined with more deliberate efforts to assimilate Filipino muslims, 
led to political marginalization and the deprivation of rights.17  The Filipino 
government adopted an aggressive policy of integration that allowed 
Muslims to retain certain customary rights18 while gradually phasing out 
Muslim practices among the southern provinces.19    
Tensions began to mount as Filipino Muslims were deprived of the 
relative autonomy they had enjoyed under both the Spanish and American 
governments.  Violent skirmishes throughout the 1960s culminated in the 
Jabidah Massacre of 1968 in which Christian officers summarily executed at 
least fourteen Muslim members of the military for an alleged mutiny.20  The 
ensuing outcry among the Muslim population contributed to the rise of the 
pseudo-terrorist organization the Moro National Liberation Front 
(“MNLF”). 21   As violence ripped across the southern region, President 
Marcos declared martial law in 1972.22  Rather than solving the crisis, the 
declaration of martial law sparked greater violence between the government 
and Islamic resistance groups.23   
Conflict permeated the Philippines, especially in the South, for years 
following the implementation of martial law. 24  In November of 1976, the 
Republic of the Philippines and the MNLF reached a tentative peace 
agreement in the Tripoli Agreement.25  Under the terms of the agreement, the 
government agreed to grant greater regional autonomy to the southern 
Philippines.26  Significantly, the agreement also provided for the creation of 
Shari‛a courts.27  The Tripoli Agreement did not end the conflict or directly 
                                                     
15
  Id. at 417. 
16
  Marly A. Bacaron, Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in Mindanao: Is Their 
Institutionalisation the Answer?, 3 ASIAN J. OF PUB. AFF. 49, 49 (2009). 
17
  Holbrook, supra note 2, at 417. 
18
  For example, Muslim marriages were formally exempted from civil marriage requirements and 
could be performed in accordance with Muslim rites for a period of twenty years.  Id. 
19
  Id. at 417-18.   
20
  FRANCIA, supra note 4, at 248.  According to a survivor, the Muslim troops had refused to fight 
other Muslims.  Id. 
21
  Id. at 247-51. 
22
  Daniel Joseph Ringuet, The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in Mindanao, 24 CONTEMP. 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 33, 38-39 (2002). 
23
  Id. 
24
  FRANCIA, supra note 4, at 249-50. 
25
  Ringuet, supra note 22, at 40. 
26
  Tripoli Agreement, Phil.-Moro National Liberation Front, Dec. 23, 1976, reprinted in INT’L 
STUDIES INST. OF THE PHIL., MUSLIM FILIPINO STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE: 
SELECTED DOCUMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE ON THE TRIPOLI AGREEMENT, SEPTEMBER 12-13, 2-3 (1985) 
[hereinafter Tripoli Agreement]. 
27
  Id. at 3. 
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result in appreciably greater autonomy for the southern Philippines. 28  
Nonetheless, as the first substantive meeting between the Philippine 
government and Muslim rebels, it represented a major step in the peace 
process and became a benchmark for future negotiations, 29  including 
discussions pertaining to the establishment of the CMPL.  
B. The CMPL Originated to Address Fundamental Differences Between 
Christian and Muslim Personal Laws 
A significant source of tension arose in the form of laws that reflected 
a Christian approach to personal relationships while simultaneously 
excluding Muslim views.  Relatively early in the period of violent conflict 
between Muslim rebel groups and the Filipino government, both sides 
considered the implementation of elements of Islamic law as one way of 
bridging the volatile divide between the two sides.  Many Muslim leaders 
hoped that the codification of Islamic law and its incorporation into the legal 
system would resolve many of the problems that beset the region. 30  
Presidential Decree 1083 achieved this goal in 1977, formally recognizing 
Islamic law in the Philippines in certain instances. 31   However, the 
codification of Islamic law did not have the wide-reaching impact that many 
anticipated. 
1. Several Provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines Clash with 
Traditional Muslim Law 
Differences in attitudes toward personal relationships posed problems 
for reconciliation between Muslims and Christians.  The Family Code,32 
based on Catholic values, conflicts with Muslim personal law in several 
areas.33  Tension persisted, particularly in the areas of marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance. 34   This tension is exemplified by sharply differing attitudes 
toward divorce, where fundamental Muslim beliefs do not fit comfortably 
within the prevailing Catholic views of the Family Code.  Divorce, although 
                                                     
28
  Ringuet, supra note 22, at 41. 
29
  Id. 
30
  G. Carter Bentley, Islamic Law in Christian Southeast Asia: The Politics of Establishing Shari-a 
Courts in the Philippines, 29 PHILIPPINE STUD. 45, 50-51 (1981). 
31
  CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, Pres. Dec. 1083. 
32  FAMILY CODE, Exec. Ord. 209, as amended. 
33
  See generally JAINAL D. RASUL, COMPARATIVE LAWS: THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND 
THE MUSLIM CODE (1994) (providing a detailed comparison of the Family Code and Muslim personal law 
as codified in the CMPL). 
34
  Id. 
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permitted under the Family Code, is strictly circumscribed. 35   Legal 
separation may be granted only in the case of physical violence against a 
spouse or child, physical or moral pressure to change religious or political 
affiliation, an attempt to corrupt a spouse or child, a prison sentence of six 
years or more, drug addiction, homosexuality, bigamy, infidelity, attempted 
murder, or abandonment.36  An “absolute divorce” is permitted only in the 
case of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the 
husband.37  Muslim tradition, in contrast, provides for six types of divorce:  
a husband’s repudiation of his wife (talaq), a wife’s repudiation of her 
husband (tafwid), a husband’s vow to refrain from intimate relations with his 
wife (ila), a husband’s comparison of his wife to a relative (zihar), unproven 
accusations of adultery by either spouse (li’an), and the wife’s redemption in 
court (khul’). 38   The Muslim approach to divorce encompasses a much 
broader spectrum of activities than the Filipino Catholic approach, allowing 
divorce when the couple can no longer live together because they are 
incompatible, either party is unfaithful, the husband is impotent, or the 
husband is an alcoholic and abuses his wife.39  Excluding central Muslim 
values from the laws controlling intimate matters contributed to the tension 
between Christians and Muslims.  
2. Presidential Decree 1083 Codified Muslim Personal Laws 
The Marcos administration contemplated a system of Muslim personal 
laws as early as the Constitutional Convention of 1971,40 but this approach 
to resolving the conflict did not garner serious attention until 1973, when 
Marcos issued Memorandum Order No. 370.41  This Memorandum created a 
research staff tasked with collecting materials on Islamic laws, reconciling 
the laws of the Philippines with Islamic laws, and creating a Proposed Draft 
of the Muslim Code (“Proposed Draft”).42  The staff conducted two months 
                                                     
35
  FAMILY CODE, § 55.  
36
  Id. 
37
  RASUL, supra note 33, at 111. 
38
  See BARA-ACAL, supra note 12, at 141-77.  
39
  RASUL, supra note 33, at 121; see also Aurelia Miller, Note and Comment, “Until Death Do Us 
Part?”: A Proposal for the Philippines to Legalize Divorce, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L. 181, 186-90 (2008) 
(discussing these differences, and indicating that divorce, while permitted among Muslims, is rare). 
40
  Holbrook, supra note 2, at 420. 
41
  See Hamid A. Barra, The Shariah Law in the Philippines: An Introduction, 13 DANSALAN Q. 2, 70 
(1993) [hereinafter Barra, Introduction]. 
42
  Michael O. Mastura & Musib M. Buat, The Introduction of Muslim Law into the Philippine Legal 
System, in ON THE CODIFICATION OF MUSLIM CUSTOMARY (ADAT) AND QURANIC LAWS 355, 364 (2d ed. 
1976).  See MUSLIM LAW CODE (Proposed Draft 1974) for the result of the committee’s efforts. 
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of fieldwork in eleven provinces in Mindanao and Sulu43 and consulted 
leaders throughout the southern Philippines.44  The staff did not intend the 
Proposed Draft to be a final draft, but rather sought to provide a tool for a 
Code Commission to use when establishing a permanent code. 45   The 
government criticized the Proposed Draft from the start.  The chair of the 
Judiciary Code Committee directed six pointed questions and observations 
to the drafters, inquiring after their motives.46  Among these, the chair noted 
“it would appear that you gentlemen who are Muslim would rather secede 
than integrate.”47  Critics of the Proposed Draft expressed concern that it 
would lead to the creation of a “state within the state.”48 
Dissatisfied with the Proposed Draft, Marcos issued Executive Order 
No. 442, creating a Presidential Commission to review the Proposed Draft. 49  
The commission, headed by Islamic convert Cesar Majul,50 presented its 
own draft on August 29, 1975.51  It was not until February 4, 1977, however, 
following the Tripoli Agreement, that Marcos finally signed the CMPL into 
law as Presidential Decree 1083.52 
The stated purposes of the CMPL include 1) the formal recognition of 
the legal system of the Muslims as part of the law of the land; 2) the 
codification of Muslim personal laws; and 3) provision for an effective 
administration and enforcement of Muslim personal law.53  While the CMPL 
had the potential to increase political power and secure additional rights for 
Muslims, it has remained an ineffectual afterthought in the larger framework 
of the legal system of the Philippines. 
III. THE CMPL HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIVE RELIEF TO 
MUSLIMS IN NEED OF LEGAL REMEDIES 
Few Filipino Muslims experienced marked change following the 
advent of the CMPL.  The CMPL and other government concessions had the 
immediate effect of reducing the violence that engulfed the Philippines 
throughout the 1970s and improving foreign relations between the Marcos 
                                                     
43
  Barra, Introduction, supra note 41, at 70.  
44
  Bentley, supra note 30, at 55. 
45
  Id. at 57. 
46
  Mastura & Buat, supra note 42, at 356-57. 
47
  Id. at 356. 
48
  Bentley, supra note 30, at 58. 
49
  Barra, Introduction, supra note 41, at 72-73. 
50
  Bentley, supra note 30, at 62. 
51
  See infra Part III.B.2 for an extensive discussion of some of the differences between the Proposed 
Draft and the final draft of the CMPL. 
52
  CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, Pres. Dec. 1083.  
53
  Id. § 3. 
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administration and those nations that had questioned his tactics.54  However, 
the CMPL has had little tangible effect on the daily lives of most Muslims 
due to 1) practical and procedural obstacles within the current system, 2) 
limitations on the application of customary law, and 3) the omission of 
sources of authority acknowledged by Filipino muslims.  As a result of these 
limitations, the CMPL has not supplanted the local and customary law that 
many Muslims turn to for resolution of their day-to-day concerns. 
A. Shortcomings in Procedure and the Practical Application of the 
CMPL Have Limited Its Influence and Efficacy 
A series of procedural and practical shortcomings have prevented the 
CMPL from becoming an effective resource for Muslims seeking to resolve 
disputes.  Muslims struggle to access the Shari‛a court system due to 
inadequate staffing and a lack of familiarity with the CMPL.  Muslims are 
also reluctant to rely upon the Shari‛a courts because they are not binding on 
non-Muslims and the non-Muslim Supreme Court may review and reject the 
decisions of the Shari‛a courts. 
1. The Shari‛a Court System Is Understaffed and Underutilized 
Many Muslims lack awareness or understanding of the CMPL due to 
shortcomings in the functioning of the CMPL and the Shari‛a courts.  These 
shortcomings stem from inadequate court staffing, difficulties in physically 
accessing the courts, and a failure to educate people about the CMPL. 
The CMPL established fifty-one circuit courts and five district 
courts.55  The circuit courts possess jurisdiction over offenses defined and 
punished under the CMPL and over civil matters pertaining primarily to 
marriage, divorce, and inheritance.56  The district courts have jurisdiction to 
hear all other cases under the CMPL, including appeals from the circuit 
courts. 57   While the CMPL provided for Shari‛a courts in 1977, the 
government did not establish any courts until the mid-1980s. 58   More 
significantly, as recently as 2009, the Shari‛a courts were not functioning at 
anywhere near capacity.59 
                                                     
54
  Bentley, supra note 30, at 65. 
55
  CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, Pres. Dec. 1083, §§ 137, 150. 
56
  Id. § 155.  
57
  Id. §§ 143-144. 
58
  Holbrook, supra note 2, at 426. 
59
  2009 SUP. CT. OF PHIL. ANN. REP. 83, available at 
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/publications/reports/SC_Annual_09.pdf.  In 2009, only thirty-one of fifty-five 
judgeships were filled.  Id. 
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A lack of qualified Shari‛a judges and lawyers presents perhaps the 
greatest practical difficulty in implementing a system of Islamic law in the 
Philippines.  Some problems stem from the requirements for admission to 
the bench.  The President must appoint all Shari‛a judges. 60   The 
qualifications for district judges under the CMPL are the same as those for 
judges of a comparable rank in the Philippine legal system.61  Additionally, 
the CMPL requires district judges to be “learned” in Islamic law and 
jurisprudence. 62   The qualifications for circuit court positions are less 
stringent, requiring that a judge be a natural-born citizen who is at least 
twenty-five years old and has passed the Shari‛a bar examination.63   
Low bar passage rates have been and remain a persistent problem, 
contributing to the shortage of judges.  At the first Shari‛a bar examination, 
held in 1983, only fourteen applicants passed out of a group of more than 
one hundred. 64   While performance improved in the following years, 
applicants continue to struggle.  Nearly three decades after the first exam, 
passage rates continue to hover around—and often below—thirty percent.65     
The education system has failed to adequately train Islamic jurists.  
This failure has had a ripple effect on the appointment of judges.  Low 
passage rates on both the regular bar exam and the Shari‛a bar exam have 
resulted in understaffed Shari‛a courts.  As of December 2009, only thirty-
one of fifty-one circuit court judgeships were filled, and none of the five 
district court judgeships were filled with permanent judges.66  Senate Bill 
1346, introduced in July of 2010, proposed expanding the Shari‛a court 
system.  It would have increased the number of Shari‛a districts from five to 
eleven, and increased the number of circuit courts to eighty-eight, eight for 
each district.67  However, this bill had not moved past the committee stage as 
                                                     
60
  CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, Pres. Dec. 1083, §§ 139, 151. 
61
  Id. § 140; An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other 
Purposes, B.P.Blg. 129, § 15 (Aug. 14, 1981) (establishing that judges must be natural-born citizens of the 
Philippines, must be thirty-five years of age, and must have practiced law in the Philippines for ten years).
 
62
  CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, Pres. Dec. 1083, §140. 
63
  Id. at § 152. 
64
  Holbrook, supra note 2, at 426-27. 
65
  Id. at 427.  In 2008, only thirty-five of one hundred and thirty-three applicants (26%) passed the 
Shari‘a bar examination.  Id. 
66
  2009 SUP. CT. OF PHIL. ANN. REP., supra note 59, at 83.  See also Tomawis v. Balindong, G.R. No. 
182434 (S.C., March 5, 2010) (noting that a Shari‘a appellate court consisting of a presiding justice and 
two associate justices had yet to be established). 
67
  An Act Establishing the Shari‘a District Court System in the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao and in the Areas Outside the Said Autonomous Region, Amending for the Purpose Presidential 
Decree No. 1083 Otherwise Known as the Muslim Code of Personal Laws of the Philippines, Providing 
Funds Therefor and for other Purposes, S.B. 1346, 15th Cong. (July 13, 2010) [hereinafter S.B. 1346] . 
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of November 2011 68  and would serve no practical purpose unless new 
positions could be filled with qualified jurists. 
Staffing challenges have contributed to another serious impediment to 
the expansion of the CMPL:  low caseloads.  Shari‛a courts tried only 314 of 
363,297 cases decided by the lower courts in the Philippines in 2009, or less 
than 0.1%.69  While a lack of adequately trained jurists limits the number of 
cases the courts can hear, it is not the sole cause of low caseloads.  Ignorance 
of the courts, dissatisfaction with the courts, and a lack of familiarity with 
the CMPL also pose major problems.   
The CMPL restricts the Shari‛a courts to the southern Philippines,70 a 
relatively underdeveloped and impoverished area71  that sees fewer cases 
litigated.  The southern Philippines remain a largely rural, agrarian society.72  
The Shari‛a courts, on the other hand, are limited to urban areas; due to their 
relative locations and lack of familiarity with the CMPL, many Muslims are 
unable to access the courts.73  
Several agencies have tried to spread awareness of the CMPL.  The 
Asian Institute of Journalism and Communication produced several 
pamphlets intended to educate people about the CMPL and the Shari‛a 
courts by explaining provisions of the CMPL, the composition of the courts, 
and the process involved in accessing them.74  However, these publications 
have not achieved a noticeable change in the popularity of the Shari‛a courts.   
Even among Muslims who are aware of the CMPL, many simply do 
not understand it.  In a 2007 survey of influential Muslims, more than half of 
the respondents who were not Shari‛a lawyers indicated that they “know a 
little” or “don’t know anything” about the CMPL.75   Among traditional 
                                                     
68
 See Sharia District Court System, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES 15TH CONGRESS, 
http://www.senate.gov.ph/lis/bill_res.aspx?congress=15&q=SBN-1346 (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).  
69
  2009 SUP. CT. OF PHIL. ANN. REP., supra note 59, at 59. 
70
  See CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, Pres. Dec. 1083, §§ 138, 150.  S.B. 1346 would provide 
for expansion into three northern Districts:  Southern Luzon, Northern Luzon, and the Visayas.  S.B. 1346, 
supra note 67. 
71
  Ringuet, supra note 22, at 44-45. 
72
  See Press Release, Phil. Nat’l Statistics Office, Philippines: Urban Population Was Registered at 
48.0 Percent (Oct. 10, 2003), http://www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2003/pr0382tx.html (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2011) (stating the urban population in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was only 
21.2%). 
73
  See LINDA LUZ GUERRERO ET AL., THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS IN PRACTICE: WHAT 
INFLUENTIAL MUSLIMS AND SHARIA LAWYERS THINK 120-21 (2007). 
74
  See ASIAN INSTITUTE OF JOURNALISM AND COMMUNICATION, A PRIMER ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM 
PERSONAL LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES, available at 
http://www.muslimmindanao.ph/shari%27a/pesonal_laws.pdf; see also ASIAN INSTITUTE OF JOURNALISM 
AND COMMUNICATION, COURTS FOR MUSLIMS: A PRIMER ON THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA COURTS, available at 
http://www.muslimmindanao.ph/shari%27a/code_muslim.pdf. 
75
  See GUERRERO ET AL., supra note 73, at 19, 82-83.  Even among Shari‘a lawyers, 58% first 
learned of the CMPL during their Shari‘a training.  Id. 
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leaders, three quarters knew little or nothing.76  Based on the backgrounds of 
those surveyed, 77 the average Muslim is likely even less familiar with the 
CMPL.  To date, efforts to promote understanding and utilization of the 
CMPL among Muslims of the southern Philippines have proven inadequate.   
2. The CMPL Is Not Binding on Non-Muslims and Is Limited to the 
Southern Philippines 
The CMPL’s procedural shortcomings undermine Muslims’ ability to 
rely upon the CMPL and Shari‛a courts, exacerbating practical problems.  
These shortcomings limit the CMPL’s ability to improve the legal status of 
Muslims by restricting the CMPL’s jurisdiction to Muslims, restricting its 
geographic jurisdiction almost entirely to the South, and subjecting the 
decisions of the Shari‛a courts to review by the non-Muslim Supreme Court.   
The CMPL applies only to Muslims and courts may not construe it to 
the prejudice of a non-Muslim.78  This raises potentially significant problems 
for Muslim litigants in cases involving non-Muslims or converts, as 
illustrated in the case Bondagjy v. Bondagjy.79  Bondagjy involved a custody 
battle between a Muslim man and a Catholic woman.  The wife converted to 
Islam prior to marriage, then converted back to Catholicism upon separation 
from her husband.80  The Shari‛a district court decided the case by applying 
the CMPL, holding that the wife was unworthy to care for her children for 
reasons of moral depravity.81  The Supreme Court, which retains power to 
review Shari‛a court decisions,82 reversed the district court, observing that 
the wife failed to register her conversion to Islam in accordance with the 
CMPL and the Court should thus consider the Family Code as it applied to a 
non-Muslim woman. 83  The Court applied the Family Code and granted the 
mother custody, emphasizing that the welfare of the minors was the 
controlling consideration under the Family Code.84   
                                                     
76
  Id. 
77
  Of respondents, 78% were college graduates and 52% had post-graduate education; 95% could 
read and write English, the language used in the court system.  By contrast, among the general population 
in 2006, only 65% could read English and only 48% could write English.  Id. at 19-21. 
78
  CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, Pres. Dec. 1083, § 3.  The sole exception to this rule arises 
when a non-Muslim woman marries a Muslim man in a Muslim ceremony, though the Supreme Court has 
cast doubt on this.  See Bondagjy v. Bondagjy, G.R. No. 140817 (S.C., Dec. 7, 2001) available at 
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/dec2001/gr_140817_2001.html.  
79
  Bondagjy v. Bondagjy, G.R. No. 140817.  
80
  Id. 
81
  Id.  The Court does not go into detail regarding the wife’s conduct.  Id. 
82
  See infra text accompanying notes 88-94 (discussing this power and its implications). 
83
  Bondagjy v. Bondagjy, G.R. No. 140817. 
84
  Id.   
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Bondagjy illustrates a major concern for Muslims who are considering 
utilizing the CMPL:  Muslims may not rely upon the decisions of the Shari‛a 
courts when dealing with non-Muslims.  As such, the CMPL in its current 
form cannot serve to balance legal relationships between Muslims and non-
Muslims.  So long as one party is non-Muslim in the eyes of the state,85 the 
non-Muslim party may control the choice of law used to decide the case. 
The CMPL’s jurisdiction is also limited geographically, applying only 
in the five enumerated Shari‛a districts.86  Under this framework, the Shari‛a 
courts cannot render a decision in a dispute arising outside of the Shari‛a 
districts. 87   As such, the Shari‛a court system remains inaccessible to 
Muslims in provinces that lack a Shari‛a district court.  
While the CMPL allows Muslims to take legal action against other 
Muslims, it provides little opportunity to challenge the actions of the 
Christian majority.  Christians—both individuals and the government—
remain effectively immune from judgment under the CMPL and are subject 
to suit only in courts controlled by predominantly Christian judges who 
apply a system of law that has been influenced by Catholic values.  The 
Bondagjy case also highlights another jurisdictional shortcoming of the 
CMPL:  the Supreme Court’s power to interpret the CMPL. 
3. The Supreme Court of the Philippines May Interpret the CMPL 
The Supreme Court may hear an appeal of any Shari‛a court decision.  
The Constitution of the Philippines, revised in 1987, provides that the 
Supreme Court may “[r]eview, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal 
or certiorari . . . final judgments and orders of lower courts. . . .” 88   This 
provision allowed the Court to overturn the Shari‛a court’s decision in 
Bondagjy v. Bondagjy.89   Eight years later, it also allowed the Court to 
                                                     
85
  It bears mentioning that the Shari‘a courts are empowered to make a finding of fact as to whether 
an individual is a Muslim, though this determination may be reviewed by the Supreme Court.  See 
Montañer v. Shari‘a District Court, Fourth Shari‘a Judicial District, Marawi City, G.R. No. 174975, 576 
S.C.R.A. 746, 755-56 (S.C., Jan. 20, 2009). 
86
  Senate Bill 1346, introduced in July of 2010, would amend §138 of Pres. Dec. 1083 to provide for 
the creation of Shari‘a courts outside of the southern Philippines.  S.B. 1346, supra note 67. 
87
  See Anshari P. Ali, Legal Impediments to the Application of Islamic Family Law in the 
Philippines, 27 J. OF MUSLIM MINORITY AFF. 93, 108 (2007) (citing Vda. de Maraug v. Silapan, G.R. 
64519, 128 S.C.R.A. 470 (S.C., Mar. 29, 1984) (holding that the CMPL does not apply outside the 
enumerated Shari‘a districts and thus distributing a deceased Muslim’s estate according to the Family 
Code)); see also Awadhi v. Astih, G.R. No. 81969, 165 S.C.R.A. 771, 775-77 (S.C., Sept. 26, 1988) 
(holding in part that the Fourth Shari‘a District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a case involving two 
individuals who lived outside that district). 
88
  CONST. (1987), art. VIII, § 5, cl. 2; see also CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, Pres. Dec. 1083, 
§ 145. 
89
  See Bondagjy v. Bondagjy, G.R. No. 140817.  
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weigh the issue of divorce between the same couple in Bondagjy v. Artadi.90  
In reaching its decision, the Court turned to Islamic law to determine which 
types of evidence the Shari‛a court was obliged to consider when ruling on 
matters of res judicata. 91   The second Bondagjy case raises legitimate 
concerns about the appellate process.   
The Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to examine and 
interpret the CMPL.92  The Court’s decision becomes part of the law of the 
Philippines.93   This presents some problems for the advancement of the 
CMPL.  The Supreme Court does not include any Muslim justices.94  As a 
result, a group with little practical knowledge of Muslim traditions or 
training in Shari‛a shapes the contours of Islamic law.  To date, the court has 
been able to resolve most issues before it based on grounds of procedure and 
venue.95  However, as more complicated issues of Islamic law reach the 
Supreme Court, the Justices will face significant challenges interpreting the 
CMPL in a fashion that is consistent with Shari‛a.  The Supreme Court’s 
lack of familiarity with Islamic jurisprudence presents a serious threat to the 
integrity of the CMPL as an Islamic legal system. 
Muslims will remain reluctant to trust the CMPL or Shari‛a court 
rulings so long as they believe that they will not be entitled to judgment 
based on the CMPL when standing before the Supreme Court.  The resulting 
fear that the CMPL and Islamic law will be interpreted incorrectly by a court 
that lacks subject knowledge reinforces the perception that Muslim beliefs 
are secondary to those of Christians.   
B. The CMPL Limits Customary Law and Rejects Several Sources of 
Authority That Are Influential in the Muslim-Filipino Experience 
While procedural and practical shortcomings have created obstacles to 
the widespread adoption of the CMPL throughout the southern Philippines, 
there is evidence that the CMPL’s problems go deeper, reaching to the very 
heart of Filipino Muslims’ conception of their religious identity.  Under 
Shari‛a, judges may draw upon a wide variety of interpretations of Islamic 
                                                     
90
  See Bondagjy v. Artadi, G.R. No. 170406, 561 S.C.R.A. 633 (S.C., Aug. 11, 2008).  
91
  Id. at 643-45 
92
  CONST. (1987), art. VIII, § 5, cl. 2. 
93
  CIVIL CODE, § 8, Rep. Act 386, as amended. 
94
  See Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, 
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/justices/index.php (last visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
95
  See, e.g., Musa v. Moson, G.R. No. 95574, 200 S.C.R.A. 715, 721 (S.C., Aug. 16, 1991) (finding 
Shari‘a court was a proper venue to resolve a dispute over a Muslim decedent’s property that was located 
within a Shari‘a district even though decedent had resided outside of that district); Awadhi v. Astih, G.R. 
No. 81969, 165 S.C.R.A. 771 (S.C., Sept. 26, 1988). 
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law that have developed over the course of one and a half millennia.96  As 
such, sources of law play a crucial role in a given community’s 
understanding of what it means to be Muslim.  The CMPL identifies several 
sources of law upon which judges may draw when making their decisions, 
including the CMPL itself, Islamic law as interpreted by the four orthodox 
schools of thought, and customary law.  While the CMPL allows for the use 
of customary law, its failure to provide a vehicle by which customary law 
may be introduced into the legal system limits the ability of judges to do so. 
1. The CMPL Implies a Distinction Between Customary Law and 
Shari‛a That Many Filipino Muslims Do Not Acknowledge 
One of the CMPL’s principal shortcomings stems from its preference 
for Shari‛a that has been specifically codified within the CMPL or drawn 
from the four traditional Sunni schools of thought.  This tendency minimizes 
the role of Shari‛a drawn from customary law, or adat.  Adat holds a 
powerful place in the lives of many Filipino Muslims, but the CMPL limits 
the manner in which it can be introduced into the Shari‛a courts. 
More than two-thirds of the CMPL’s 190 articles consist of fairly 
specific statutory provisions covering marriage, divorce, paternity, 
guardianship, and inheritance.97   To the extent that they are clear, these 
provisions constitute the Islamic law of the Philippines.  When dealing with 
issues that are not covered by express provisions, courts may take other 
sources of Islamic law into account. 98   Among these sources are the 
teachings of the four orthodox schools of thought, or madhhabs.99  Over the 
course of centuries, the madhhabs have created vast libraries to impart their 
view of Shari‛a based on various methods of interpretation.100  The CMPL 
indicates that these scholarly works may be given persuasive weight.101   
The CMPL also provides for the use of adat.102  The word adat is 
Arabic, literally translated as “customs.” 103   When Islam arrived in the 
Philippines, local tribes gradually combined it with customary laws that 
                                                     
96
  See Barra, Introduction, supra note 41, at 5-22 (discussing various sources of Shari‘a). 
97
  See CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, Pres. Dec. 1083. 
98
  Id. § 4. 
99
  Id. §§ 4, 6. 
100
  See Clark B. Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt: The Incorporation of the 
Shari‘a into Egyptian Constitutional Law in STUD. IN ISLAMIC LAW AND SOC’Y 19, 13-18 (Ruud Peters & 
Bernard Weiss eds., 2006) for a concise introduction to the madhhabs. 
101
  CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, Pres. Dec. 1083, § 4. 
102
  Id. §§ 5, 7. 
103
  Salipada S. Tamano, Mindanao State University: Its Role in the Development of the Study of Adat 
Laws, in ON THE CODIFICATION OF MUSLIM CUSTOMARY (ADAT) AND QURANIC LAWS, 355, 15-16 (2d ed. 
1976). 
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predated Islam in the region, resulting in a system of law that is neither 
entirely Islamic nor entirely customary.104   Adat in its modern manifestation 
in the Philippines is “founded on the bedrock of Islamic traditions and 
handed down through various generations.”105  While adat can vary greatly 
from one region to the next, taking the form of extensive codifications or 
simply establishing certain procedures for the administration of laws, it 
generally proscribes community conduct and individual behavior.106  Despite 
geographic variations, most Filipino Muslims share a strong concept of 
adat.107  Tellingly, the CMPL distinguishes “Muslim law” and “adat.”108   
Despite their intertwined nature, some Filipino muslims in the legal 
profession, including several who were involved in the CMPL’s drafting 
process, speak of adat and Muslim law as though the two are distinct.  
Michael Mastura, a Muslim and the only person to serve on the drafting 
committees for both the Proposed Draft and the CMPL, distinguished 
Islamic law from customary law when identifying factors that shaped the 
spiritual, social, and political environment of the Muslim community in the 
Philippines. 109   Other prominent Muslims have drawn the same 
distinction.110  There is an implication in their statements that the phrases 
“Muslim law” or “Islamic law” refer to the scholarly interpretations of 
Shari‛a set forth in the works of the madhhabs.  The CMPL’s apparent 
adoption of this position is at odds with the conceptions and experiences of 
many Muslims in rural areas. 
The CMPL’s portrayal of adat as distinct from Shari‛a misrepresents 
the importance of adat not only as a legitimate source of law but also as an 
expression of Islam.  Educated Muslims living in cities tend to consider 
themselves Muslim Filipinos.111   By contrast, the vast majority of those 
                                                     
104
  Macapanton Y. Abbas, Jr., The Historical, Political, Social and Legal Justifiation for the 
Codification and Enforcement of Mulsim Laws and Adat Laws, in ON THE CODIFICATION OF MUSLIM 
CUSTOMARY (ADAT) AND QURANIC LAWS 163, 182 (2d ed. 1976). 
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  Tamano, supra note 103, at 16. 
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  Id. at 16-19. 
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  Id. at 16. 
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  CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, Pres. Dec. 1083, § 5. 
109
  Michael O. Mastura, The Philippine State and “Secularized” Muslim Concepts: Aspects and 
Problems, in ON THE CODIFICATION OF MUSLIM CUSTOMARY (ADAT) AND QURANIC LAWS 217, 223 (2d ed. 
1976). 
110
  See Mamitua Saber, The Contact Between Traditional and Legal Authority Systems in a Muslim 
Setting, in ON THE CODIFICATION OF MUSLIM CUSTOMARY (ADAT) AND QURANIC LAWS 288, 294 (2d ed. 
1976); M. Sc. Soeraharjo, The Law Within the Legal System to Overcome Legal Conflicts Between 
Customary (Adat) Law, Islamic and Western Laws in Force in Indonesia, in ON THE CODIFICATION OF 
MUSLIM CUSTOMARY (ADAT) AND QURANIC LAWS 339, 344-45 (2d ed. 1976).    
111
  Robert McAmis, Muslim Filipinos: 1970-1972, in ON THE CODIFICATION OF MUSLIM CUSTOMARY 
(ADAT) AND QURANIC LAWS 65, 68 (2d ed. 1976). 
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living in rural areas identify themselves primarily by reference to their tribe 
or religious subgroup.112  These people rely upon the traditional order and its 
inherent authority.113  Within that order, adat plays a crucial role in shaping 
personal and legal relationships and is seen as a vital part of the Shari‛a.   
For many tribal groups in the southern Philippines, adat supplies the 
primary source of law.114  The Tausug, one of the most prominent Muslim 
tribes of the southern Philippines,115 look to the so-called “headman” or 
sarah to serve as the “arbiter of conflicts and disputes.”116  The sarah—a 
term derived from Shari‛a 117 —embraces a role that entails religious, 
political, social, and legal duties.118   The sarah applies adat. 119   To the 
Tausug, adat is an expression of Islam and the Shari‛a.  In contrast to the 
drafters of the CMPL, who effectively conflate Shari‛a and with its scholarly 
interpretations, the Tausug distinguish these two legal concepts.120  Shari‛a is 
the body of revealed laws, and the interpretations of the madhhabs comprise 
only one expression of it; 121  to the Tausug, adat is as legitimate an 
expression of revealed law as orthodox interpretation.122   
The enduring importance of adat can also be seen in the approach to 
clan violence in rural areas of the southern Philippines.  The rido, a term 
which refers to prolonged feuds between families or clans, has cost 
thousands of lives over the last century. 123  Recently, Muslim communities 
have relied upon three alternative concepts of justice by which a feud may 
be resolved:  customary law, Islamic law, and Philippine law.124  Despite the 
availability of three viable approaches to conflict resolution, customary law 
predominates.125  This is due in part to abuse of state institutions,126 resulting 
in a lack of trust in the justice administered by those institutions.  Customary 
law also appeals because the parties to a dispute generally accept the 
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  Id. 
113
  Saber, supra note 110, at 291. 
114
  See, e.g., HADJI MASHUR BIN-GHALIB JUNDAM, TUNGGAL HULAH-DUWA SARAH: ADAT AND 
SHAREE’AH LAWS IN THE LIFE OF THE TAUSUG 33 (2006). 
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  See JAINAL D. RASUL, SR, ISLAM AND THE FILIPINO MUSLIMS 77 (2009). 
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  Id. at 31. 
118
  Id. at 38-39. 
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  Id. at 86. 
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at 198. 
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procedure, respect the integrity of the mediators, and will consent to be 
bound by the result.127 
Although the CMPL provides for the use of adat in rendering 
decisions, its inability to recognize the decisions of local Muslim courts 
impedes its functional ability to include adat. There are three traditional 
vehicles for conflict resolution under adat, roughly translated as resolution 
by genealogy, consensus, and the Book.128  Resolution by the Book draws on 
the Qur‘an as interpreted by a judge, or kali (Ar:  qadi).129  The kali courts—
effectively local trial courts—are pillars of the Muslim community.130  Their 
jurisdiction extends to matters of communal life, particularly dispute 
resolution.131  Despite their significance within many Muslim communities, 
the CMPL does not recognize the decisions of these courts.   
The kali courts are, at root, tribal courts.  They remain marginalized 
due to their omission from the CMPL.132  The Supreme Court dashed what 
little hope these courts had of official recognition in Badua v. Cordillera 
Bodong Administration.133  In Badua, the Court held that tribal courts lie 
outside the Philippine judicial system, thus lacking judicial power:  the 
decisions of these courts are given no consideration when challenged in the 
Philippine judiciary.134  The exclusion of the kali courts from the Shari‛a 
court system eliminates one of the clearest avenues for adat to influence 
interpretations of Islamic law.   
Over centuries, adat has become tightly interwoven with Muslims’ 
understanding of their religion and identity.135   While the CMPL allows 
judges to utilize adat in theory, there is no vehicle by which they may easily 
incorporate adat into their decisions.  This limited approach to the 
incorporation of adat, exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s refusal to 
recognize the kali courts, has alienated thousands of Filipino Muslims who 
see these courts as a primary source of justice.  The CMPL’s failure to draw 
upon this crucial source of law has limited its influence.   
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  Hamid A. Barra, Conciliation, Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Under Islamic, Philippine, 
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2. The CMPL Rejects Several Sources of Authority That Play a Central 
Role in the Muslim-Filipino Experience 
While sources of law play an important role in Islamic law, sources of 
authority are equally important.  However, the CMPL curtailed or eliminated 
several instrumental sources of Muslim authority.  Muslims will remain 
reluctant to turn to the judiciary so long as it is governed by bodies that they 
do not trust.  Fearing Muslims’ desire to be wholly independent of the 
Philippine nation, the government ignored several recommendations that 
would have recognized familiar sources of Muslim authority.  In doing so, 
the government erected significant obstacles to the CMPL’s successful 
implementation. 
President Marcos created a research staff that spent two months 
conducting research throughout the southern Philippines and several more 
composing the Proposed Draft.136  However, when the staff completed its 
work, the administration rejected its proposal. 137   The administration’s 
discomfort with the proposed draft was unsurprising, given their intentions.  
As scholar G. Carter Bentley noted shortly after the adoption of the CMPL, 
 
Instead of introducing progressive new practices, [the Proposed 
Draft] would serve to institutionalize existing practices.  It 
would answer Muslim demands that their religion and customs 
be preserved, but it would not serve to “inculcate new habits 
and attitudes among Muslims.”  Inclusion of adat 
considerations lessened the possibility that “old customs” 
would be eliminated.138 
 
To further its goal of assimilation, the administration created a new 
drafting committee.139   The committee invited twenty-six senior Muslim 
lawyers to a two-day conference to share their thoughts on the proposed 
Muslim code.140  In stark contrast to the diversity of individuals with whom 
the original committee had conferred, the eighteen lawyers who attended this 
conference were trained in Philippine law rather than Shari‛a and virtually 
all had achieved status under Marcos.141  Based on the recommendations of 
this rather homogenous group, and on its members’ own beliefs, the new 
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committee prepared a code that differed from the original in several 
important ways.   
A comparison of the Proposed Draft and the CMPL indicates that the 
Marcos administration made several crucial decisions that reduced the 
likelihood that the CMPL would be embraced by the Muslim population.  In 
contrast to the religious and traditional leaders who drew upon personal 
knowledge of and experience with people who would utilize Shari‛a courts 
to influence the Proposed Draft, the academics who contributed to the 
CMPL were disconnected from the wants, needs, and religious beliefs of the 
average Filipino Muslim.  
The Proposed Draft was primarily procedural while the CMPL 
consists primarily of substantive laws.142  While many of the substantive 
laws recommended by the Proposed Draft and ultimately adopted by the 
CMPL were similar, the final form of the CMPL reduced and altered the 
proposed sources of authority that would guide the administration of laws.  
The final version retained the Shari‛a courts, the office of the jurisconsult 
(“Mufti”), and the Agama Arbitration Council in reduced roles; it also 
eliminated the consultative council (“majlis”) and the board of the ulama.143  
The administration justified the removal of these administrative bodies by 
claiming that they existed for purely religious reasons or were not urgent.144  
This reasoning overlooks the fact that Shari‛a is inherently connected to 
religion.  Efforts to separate it from its Islamic roots serve only to undermine 
the influence of the CMPL.  The decision to eliminate the majlis, in 
particular, dealt a tremendous blow to the CMPL’s efficacy by depriving 
Muslims of a group with the requisite knowledge to interpret the law to fit 
the expectations of those the CMPL was intended to serve, and the power to 
do so. 
a. Limitations on the Influence of the Shari‛a Courts, the Mufti, and the 
Agama Arbitration Council Weakened the CMPL 
The CMPL retained three sources of authority from the Proposed 
Draft, but altered each to limit its influence and autonomy.  By restricting the 
power and independence of the Shari‛a courts, the Mufti, and the Agama 
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 Id. at 61-62.  See also Barra, Introduction, supra note 41, at 75.  Compare CODE OF MUSLIM 
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Arbitration Council, the administration deprived Muslims of effective 
leadership roles in shaping the implementation of the CMPL. 
The government placed the Shari‛a courts under the supervision of the 
judiciary145 in the apparent hope that this would create a single, seamless 
judicial system.  The CMPL does not address the decision process.146  This 
omission implies that the decision-making process should follow that of the 
regular courts, which differs sharply from the Proposed Draft.  Under the 
Proposed Draft, Shari‛a court judges were to be given greater autonomy in 
reaching decisions.147  The draft explicitly urged judges to take adat into 
account.148  It also required that preliminary proceedings take the form of 
arbitration or mutual concession based on equity and justice. 149   This 
flexibility offered a decision-making process that was more familiar to most 
Muslims than the trial procedure the government adopted.  Nevertheless, the 
CMPL rejected this approach.150  As a result, the highest-ranking judges rely 
primarily on scholarly rather than customary expressions of Islam.   
The CMPL retained the Agama Arbitration Council (“Agama 
Council”), a body with limited jurisdiction to consider certain cases that do 
not require a formal trial.151  Specifically, the Agama Council may resolve 
cases involving two types of divorce,152 subsequent marriages, and some 
offenses against customary law.153  While the function of this body remained 
effectively the same between the draft and the CMPL, the draft provided for 
a Muslim chair who was appointed annually by the presiding judge in every 
district.154   Shari‛a judges would likely be more willing to refer matters to 
the Agama council if they regularly interact with a standing chair responsible 
for assembling and supervising the council rather than assembling the 
council themselves every time an issue arises that lends itself to arbitration.  
Arbitration is a popular tool among the Muslim population155 and would 
have been more familiar than the trial-based system that the CMPL favors.  
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Finally, the CMPL retained the position of jurisconsult, or Mufti.156  
Under the CMPL, a learned Muslim scholar appointed by the President may 
issue legal opinions known as fatwas to inform a judge or other interested 
party.157  However, the Mufti may only issue advisory legal opinions; the 
opinion may not bind parties.158  By contrast, under the Proposed Draft, the 
ulama— the community of learned Muslims—would have nominated 
candidates for the President to appoint.159  The Mufti would have derived 
most of his powers through a relationship with the consultative council, or 
majlis.  The Mufti was intended to work closely with a legal committee of 
the majlis, and, while the Mufti could not issue binding legal opinions, the 
legal committee could.160  When the administration eliminated the majlis 
from the CMPL, it curtailed the Mufti’s authority and influence over the 
CMPL. 
The minimization of these three sources of authority weakened the 
CMPL.  However, this damage pales in comparison to that done by the 
administration’s rejection of several other sources of authority. 
b. The Elimination of the Majlis and the Board of the Ulama Deprived 
the CMPL of Crucial Sources of Muslim Leadership and Guidance 
The Marcos administration’s decision to eliminate the majlis and the 
board of the ulama crippled the CMPL.  By eliminating the majlis, or 
consultative council, the administration removed the single most important 
source of authority within the Proposed Draft.  It is clear from its structure 
and language that the drafters intended the majlis to be the center of power 
and administration of Islamic law in the Philippines.161  The majlis was to 
have corporate status.162  It was empowered to sue or be sued; to enter into 
contracts and hold property; to act as administrator of Muslim estates or the 
trustee of Muslim trusts; to hold administrative and supervisory control over 
the traditional Muslim tax, the Shari‛a courts, and the Agama Council; and 
to promulgate fatwas and other legal rules that could bind the Shari‛a 
courts.163  The Proposed Draft intended to establish this body as the power 
behind the CMPL.  Instead, the Marcos administration did away with it.164   
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The administration did not replace the majlis with another body 
possessing comparable powers and duties.  Consequently, the elimination of 
the majlis removed any real hope that Muslims would exercise significant 
control within the CMPL framework.  The system created by the CMPL 
lacks a central body of Muslims with the power to implement and administer 
the CMPL as it sees fit.  Instead, the executive and judicial branches 
administer and supervise the CMPL.  These branches of government, 
preoccupied with other pressing concerns, have let the CMPL languish in 
obscurity.   
Under the Proposed Draft, the majlis would have been empowered to 
create a board of the ulama, a permanent group of between seven and eleven 
Muslims selected as equitably as possible from among the Muslim 
provinces.165  The drafters intended the board to advise the majlis on difficult 
questions or points of Muslim law.166  While the CMPL does not bar contact 
with the ulama—the term is used generally here to refer to the community of 
learned Muslims—it does not create a vehicle for eliciting the ulama’s 
advice.167  Nor does it create a standing body that the courts may easily 
consult on challenging questions of law.  This deprives the provinces of a 
voice and creates significant obstacles to seeking the input of the most 
qualified and respected Muslim jurists in the provinces. 
The CMPL’s failure to provide for appropriate sources of authority 
weakens an already tenuous structure.  The elimination of the majlis and the 
board of the ulama, coupled with the minimization of the Mufti and the 
Agama council, restricted the role that the Muslim community plays in 
shaping the implementation of Islamic law in the Philippines.  The 
administration’s reluctance to accept adat as a legitimate source of law 
established an unfamiliar legal system.  Aligning the Shari‛a courts with the 
national judicial system rather than traditional Islamic courts drastically 
reduced their appeal.  As a result of these decisions, the governing bodies 
and procedures that dominate the CMPL appear foreign to many Filipino 
Muslims and indicate that the government does not consider their traditions 
valid. 
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IV. THE CMPL MUST BE AMENDED TO CORRECT PROCEDURAL AND 
PRACTICAL SHORTCOMINGS AND TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT 
FILIPINO MUSLIM SOURCES OF LAW AND AUTHORITY 
While it is possible that the Marcos administration viewed the CMPL 
as little more than a tool to mollify opposition forces while changing little in 
the actual power structure of the nation,168 the current government should 
take action to transform the CMPL into an effective tool for conflict 
resolution.  This will both improve Muslims’ access to justice and indicate 
that the government is committed to resolving long-standing inequities.  The 
government must rectify practical and procedural shortcomings that have 
stymied the development of the CMPL in order for the CMPL to become 
more than an empty promise of equality for Muslims and the southern 
Philippines.   
A. The Government Must Institute a Campaign to Promote Awareness 
and Understanding of the CMPL, Improve Legal Education in the 
Southern Philippines, and Increase the Number of Shari‛a Courts 
So long as the Shari‛a courts bear only a tiny fraction of the caseload 
of Filipino courts, the CMPL will remain an afterthought in the legal system 
of the Philippines.  Jurisdictional and substantive changes have great 
potential to positively affect the expansion of the CMPL, but they will have 
little success without several practical changes.   
The government can increase the effectiveness of the CMPL cheaply 
and easily by raising public awareness of the CMPL and the Shari‛a courts.  
While dissemination of information pertaining to the CMPL presents some 
challenges, especially in predominantly rural areas of the southern 
Philippines, it is crucial in order to expand the influence of the Shari‛a 
courts.  Private organizations have made some efforts to distribute materials 
explaining the CMPL and the role of the Shari‛a courts,169 but a sustained 
information campaign is necessary to popularize the CMPL. 170   The 
government should become involved in distributing educational materials 
and should consider making the CMPL part of the curriculum in secondary 
schools in Shari‛a districts.  If Muslims are not aware of the CMPL, no 
changes in the structure or operation of the law itself will be effective. 
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In addition to spreading awareness, the government should increase 
the number of Shari‛a courts and make them more accessible to people in 
rural communities.  The courts remain limited almost exclusively to urban 
areas, preventing Muslims in rural regions from accessing them.  
Furthermore, given the shortage of qualified jurists, new courts will have 
little practical impact. 
So long as the Shari‛a courts are understaffed, they will not be able to 
assume a prominent role in the nation’s legal system.  The government 
should take concerted action to supply the courts with talented legal 
professionals to fill the integral positions of judges and lawyers within the 
system created by the CMPL.  The southern provinces, impoverished, 
underdeveloped, and racked by years of conflict, have struggled to 
implement adequate training programs for Shari‛a lawyers and judges.  
Passage rates have remained persistently low on the Shari‛a bar 
examination.171  The government should take steps to increase enrollment in 
law schools that teach Shari‛a.  These schools must become more accessible 
and improve their curriculum, a challenge that will not be remedied easily.  
Many of the difficulties that persist in improving the quality of legal 
education continue to restrict advances throughout the southern 
Philippines.172  Large-scale institutional changes will be necessary to effect 
substantive improvement.  These changes, beginning with modernizing and 
developing the economy of the southern Philippines, speak to issues 
concerning the allocation of government funds, government corruption, and 
educator performance that lie well outside the scope of this comment.  
However, these problems remain a significant obstacle to the development 
of the CMPL. 
The government must also improve its administration of the Shari‛a 
court system.  The five district court judgeships have been filled by three 
acting presiding judges rather than permanent district judges.173  There is no 
obvious reason why the administration did not appoint these presiding 
judges as permanent district judges.  All had been members of the integrated 
bar for decades 174  and had satisfied the requirements for district court 
judges,175 yet the judgeships remained vacant.176  As recently as July 2011, 
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many Shari‛a courts had not been organized or their judgeships remained 
vacant. 177   The government must be more attentive to the needs of the 
Shari‛a courts and more diligent in both training qualified jurists and filling 
vacant district court positions.   
B. The CMPL’s Jurisdiction Should Be Expanded to Apply to Muslims 
Throughout the Philippines and to Apply to Non-Muslims in 
Appropriate Situations   
The jurisdictional limitations placed on the CMPL must be removed 
or altered to expand the influence of the CMPL.  A few relatively minor 
adjustments in the application of the CMPL would create a significant shift 
in the perceived legitimacy of the CMPL.  Specifically, the CMPL should 
apply to all Muslims in the Philippines regardless of their geographic 
location and it should apply to non-Muslims in certain cases.   
The government should expand the jurisdiction of the Shari‛a courts 
to apply to individuals based on their religious identity and not their physical 
location.  A jurisdictional limitation based primarily upon geography 
magnifies tensions between the North and the South rather than mitigating 
them.  It serves as a reminder that the government does not truly view the 
different provinces of the Philippines as a unified nation of equal partners, 
but rather as a collection of states that do not share equal political or legal 
standing.  So long as the CMPL is restricted to enumerated provinces, it will 
serve as a force of division rather than unification.   
The capital city of Manila poses particular problems.  While the 
Muslim population outside of the southern Philippines is fairly small, 
estimates indicate that more than 120,000 Muslims may live in Manila.178  
More than thirty years after the official recognition of Shari‛a, this sizeable 
population still lacks access to a court system that is attuned to Muslim 
values and traditions.    
In addition to expanding the jurisdiction of Shari‛a courts from a 
geographic standpoint, the government should expand the jurisdiction of the 
CMPL to apply to non-Muslims in certain circumstances.  In its current 
manifestation, the CMPL incentivizes segregation based on religion.  
Because Muslims and Christians rarely intermarry in the Philippines—the 
practice has in fact been actively discouraged by prominent religious 
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  See JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, MASTER LIST OF INCUMBENT JUDGES (July 7, 2011), available at 
http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/masterlist/_Sharia.pdf.  
178
  Akiko Watanabe, Migration and Mosques: The Evolution and Transformation of Muslim 
Communities in Manila, the Philippines 2 (Afrasian Ctr. for Peace & Dev. Stud., Working Paper No. 37, 
2008).  
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figures179—considerations of the applicability of the CMPL to non-Muslims 
might seem of secondary importance.  Even so, the prospect of resolving 
familial difficulties, especially those that bear on child custody and 
inheritance, in a court controlled by the Christian majority and on the basis 
of a Family Code rooted in explicitly Catholic ideology acts as an additional 
deterrent to interfaith marriages.180   
The jurisdictional shortcomings of the CMPL drive a wedge further 
between Muslims and Christians.  The implementation of the CMPL 
temporarily reduced violence between these groups, but over the long term it 
has done little to solve the ultimate cause of the conflict:  the political and 
social marginalization of Muslims.  On the contrary, jurisdictional 
limitations magnify the divide between the two groups. 
The application of the CMPL to cases involving non-Muslims is a 
delicate issue that will likely draw opposition from non-Muslims.  However, 
to avoid conflict, the government may extend the CMPL’s jurisdiction to 
non-Muslims only according to contract.  Couples may agree to allow the 
CMPL to govern their union rather than the Family Code.  Similarly, 
Muslims who wish to avoid complications in inheritance may create wills 
that indicate a desire to settle disputes according to the CMPL.  This change, 
easily effected and only mildly disruptive, will signify to Muslims that their 
values are equally worthy of consideration. 
C. The Supreme Court Must Improve Its Understanding of Islamic Law 
and the CMPL 
Muslims may be skeptical of the decisions of Shari‛a courts in part 
because they are appealable to the Supreme Court.181  This body, which as of 
November 2011 had no Muslim members,182 is the final voice in interpreting 
the CMPL and decisions of the lower courts.183  This casts doubt on the 
influence that the CMPL and the Shari‛a courts may have within the 
judiciary and raises concerns about proper interpretations of Islamic law.   
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Decisions by Shari‛a courts must remain appealable to the Supreme 
Court.  Altering that requirement would undermine the Supreme Court, cast 
doubt upon the Constitution, and threaten irreparable harm to the legitimacy 
of the government and the legal system.  Nonetheless, a number of changes 
would improve the Supreme Court’s understanding of the CMPL.  The most 
obvious approach to this problem would be to include one or more Muslims 
on the Court.  The Tripoli Agreement stated that Muslims “shall be 
represented in all courts including the Supreme Court.”184  However, only a 
single Muslim has ever served on the Court.185   Abdulwahid Bidin was 
appointed by President Aquino in 1987 and served on the Court until 
1997. 186   Since his retirement, the Court has lacked Muslim 
representation.187   Adding a Muslim voice to the Supreme Court would 
further enfranchise Muslims throughout the Philippines while 
simultaneously providing the Court with insight into Muslim customs and 
belief.  The government considered this course of action when filling two 
vacancies in the summer of 2011.188  One of the strongest candidates for an 
opening on the Supreme Court was the accomplished Muslim jurist Japar 
Dimaampao. 189   However, the government instead appointed Christian 
judges Bienvenido Reyes and Estela Perlas-Bernabe.190  In doing so, the 
government missed an opportunity to grant Muslims stronger representation 
in the government.  
The opportunity to appoint a Muslim justice has passed for the 
moment.  However, the Supreme Court should take steps to ensure a more 
effective and accurate interpretation of the CMPL.  The justices should 
obtain a baseline education on the CMPL and Shari‛a in general.  The 
justices face a disadvantage when trying to render fair and consistent 
judgments based on the CMPL if they do not understand its context.  In the 
interest of furthering educational goals, law schools throughout the 
Philippines should offer courses in both the CMPL and Islamic law, and the 
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integrated bar examination should include the CMPL.191  So long as the 
CMPL comprises a portion of the law of the Philippines, legal professionals 
must have access to education in the nuances of Islamic law and the CMPL, 
at the very least.    
These practical and procedural changes, if implemented, will lead to 
greater awareness of the CMPL and somewhat greater faith in the decisions 
rendered by the Shari‛a courts.  However, more significant substantive 
changes are necessary for the CMPL to offer effective legal remedies for 
Muslims in the Philippines.  The practical and procedural problems that have 
stymied the expansion of the CMPL pose legitimate obstacles to its 
influence.  Within the last few years, the government has shown a 
willingness to work with Muslims to correct some of these problems.  
Nevertheless, without more fundamental changes within the CMPL, 
particularly in terms of the CMPL’s recognition of appropriate sources of 
law and authority, it remains unlikely that it will become an effective legal 
construct.  Until and unless the CMPL adopts an approach to Islamic law 
that resembles the experience of Muslims in the Philippines, it will struggle 
to gain popularity throughout the southern Philippines and beyond.   
D. The CMPL Should Create a More Integral Role for Adat by Including 
the Kali Courts in the Structure of the Shari‛a Court System 
Adat continues to play a central role in the lives of Muslims 
throughout the Philippines, particularly those living in rural areas.192  To 
these people, adat is an expression of Shari‛a.193 It is not possible, hundreds 
of years after the fact, to simply remove adat from their understanding of 
their culture and religion.  While the CMPL provides for the application of 
adat, it does not provide a mechanism by which adat may be introduced into 
the legal system. 194   Adat can only enter the legal system through the 
decisions of Shari‛a court judges or Supreme Court justices.195  However, 
many of these judges lack a refined understanding of or appreciation for the 
adat that prevails in rural villages throughout the southern Philippines.196  
Acknowledging the role of kali courts in local jurisprudence will remedy this 
problem. 
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The kali courts remain popular and effective in resolving community 
disputes to this day,197 particularly outside of urban areas.  While integration 
of the kali courts into the structure of the Shari‛a courts will pose some 
challenges, doing so will not impose undue burdens on the system and will 
provide a ready mechanism for incorporating adat into the Shari‛a court 
system.  The kali courts, if successfully integrated, may function in effect as 
local trial courts whose decisions may be appealed to the Shari‛a circuit 
courts.  This will require some changes.  Kalis require education in both the 
CMPL and the Constitution of the Philippines to identify provisions of adat 
that conflict with the Constitution and thus are not admissible under the 
CMPL.  They must also become familiar with the procedure and sources of 
law to which the circuit courts must adhere.   
This type of educational program does not present insurmountable 
challenges.  Identifying kalis throughout the Philippines is a relatively 
simple task.  Once identified, the government can establish week-long 
conferences or seminars to bring kalis from a given region together and 
provide an adequate foundation in constitutional law so that the kalis will be 
able to identify adat that violates the law of the land.  While this may limit 
the use of certain elements of adat, it will strengthen the elements that are 
retained.  Shari‛a judges will also need to undergo some training in local 
adat so that they may review the decisions of the kali courts.  However, as 
the CMPL requires that adat be proven as fact,198 this training need not be 
extensive.  The party relying on adat bears the burden of proving to the 
judges that it is valid.   
Many Muslims already rely upon the kali courts.199  By including the 
kali courts within the framework of the Shari‛a courts and the CMPL, the 
government can create a natural appeals process that validates traditional 
Muslim beliefs and methods of dispute resolution.   
E. The CMPL Should Be Amended to Establish the Majlis, Create a More 
Defined Role for the Ulama, and Grant the Mufti Greater Influence. 
While incorporating adat is imperative, the CMPL must also allow 
Muslims to participate in shaping the interpretation of Islamic law that 
prevails in the Philippines.  While the Shari‛a courts empower certain 
individuals, Islam has relied upon a communal approach to resolving legal 
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issues for well over a thousand years. 200   Scholars, openly engaging in 
discussion and debate, have shaped the course of Islamic law throughout the 
world.201  While the CMPL did not halt this phenomenon, it did not provide 
for this sort of dialogue in the interpretation of its provisions.  According to 
the Proposed Draft, the majlis and the board of the ulama were to play this 
role.202  Without these entities, the CMPL has failed to engage the communal 
spirit that has infused Islamic law throughout its history.  In correcting these 
shortcomings, the government should reconsider sources of authority set 
forth in the Proposed Draft. 
Providing for the creation of the majlis should be relatively simple, as 
the Proposed Draft provided specific criteria for adopting such a body.203  Its 
approach may be adopted with limited revisions.  Contrary to the objections 
of the Marcos administration,204 the majlis is not primarily a religious body; 
rather, it is a legal body that draws on religion, as any entity responsible for 
shaping Islamic law must.     
The resurrection of the majlis will allow other important sources of 
authority to take on a more prominent role in administering the CMPL.  The 
board of the ulama should be established within a more formal structure,  
allowing the community of Islamic scholars to raise concerns or offer 
suggestions.  Any recommendations that are adopted will emanate from a 
respected and authoritative group.  Similarly, incorporating the majlis into 
the CMPL will allow the Mufti to take on a more significant role.  The 
government should adopt the Proposed Draft’s recommendation to 
incorporate the Mufti into the legal committee of the majlis,205 allowing the 
Mufti to issue fatwas that may bind Muslims if adopted by the majlis.206   
Not only will these changes serve to give Muslims more of a voice in 
the interpretation of Islamic law, they will aid the Supreme Court in 
reviewing cases appealed from the Shari‛a courts.  The Supreme Court could 
turn to the majlis or the Mufti for assistance in formulating opinions 
regarding the proper interpretation of the law.  Indeed, the government 
should require the Supreme Court to consult the Mufti before ruling on cases 
arising within the CMPL.  Although the Mufti’s decisions cannot bind the 
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Court,207 they may inform the Court’s decision-making process.  If the Court 
determines that the CMPL does not govern, it need not consult the Mufti.  
However, when the case does involve an interpretation of Islamic law, the 
Court should consult an expert on the subject of Islamic law.   
While these suggestions may concern the Christian majority, they 
should not.  The President would still enjoy remarkable power to appoint 
members of the majlis and the Mufti, as well as the Shari‛a judges.208  The 
President would be wise to fill the majlis with a diverse group of Islamic 
scholars who would draw on different backgrounds to bring unique 
perspectives to potentially challenging issues.  This would not only provide 
a wealth of perspectives, but would furnish Muslims from different 
backgrounds with representation and a voice in the judicial process.  Given 
the President’s power over them, the majlis and Mufti are unlikely to 
overreach, and are unlikely to accomplish much if they do.   
These changes, which will reestablish several important sources of 
Filipino Muslim authority, will lead to a system of decision-making and 
administration within the framework of the CMPL and the Shari‛a court 
system that is more familiar to Muslims.  They will allow Muslims to feel 
ably represented and in control of the judicial system that was implemented 
in an attempt to enfranchise them.  While these suggested changes may not 
resolve all of the difficulties presented by the failure of the CMPL, they will 
go a long way toward integrating the system that the CMPL has established 
not only into the judiciary of the Philippines, but also into the customary 
legal system of Filipino Muslims. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By eliminating or marginalizing significant sources of law and 
authority, the CMPL created a system that appears foreign to many Filipino 
Muslims.  Compounded by practical and procedural shortcomings, the 
CMPL has been doomed to an existence as a largely symbolic apparatus that 
has had little effect on the lives of Muslims.   
While improving the efficacy of the CMPL and the Shari‛a courts will 
not be easy or instantaneous, it may be accomplished by instituting the 
changes proposed in this comment.  Widespread changes in the attitudes of 
Muslims toward the CMPL, and in their practical ability to access the courts, 
will inevitably take many years.  However, by incorporating a perspective on 
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Islamic law that more accurately reflects its practice in the Philippines, these 
changes could begin to pay dividends in the near future.  If the government 
increases knowledge of the CMPL and the Shari‛a courts, and is willing to 
cede some of its control over the administration of Islamic law to Muslims, 
the CMPL may assume a vibrant, effective, and culturally competent role 
within the judicial system in the Philippines, and it may eventually become a 
source of pride and accomplishment for Muslims and the nation as a whole. 
